Thursday, 4 December 2014

QK Archives: Afghanistan: Experiment in Democracy (1961-1973)

republished from the Paul Wolf online archive. This is reproduced solely for educational purposes

Afghanistan: Experiment in Democracy

Documents from the U.S. National Archives, 1961-1973

1964 Constitution
Establishment of Parliamentary System
Provincial Reorganization
Reorganization of the Ministry of Justice
Reorganization of the Courts
Social Guidance Department
Freedom of Speech
Role of Islamic Law

Official Languages
Women's Rights
Religious Conservatism
Plot to Remove Daud
Second Five-Year Plan
Kabul-Kandahar Highway
The Afghan Left


The specific objectives of the program are: creation of an independent judicial system; training of personnel in adequate numbers; reorganization of the Ministry of Justice; and drafting of new laws to fill gaps in the legal codes. ... Existing law is to be revised and enlarged and six Advisory Committees have been set up to undertake the task. These committees will report to a newly established Law Department in the Ministry of Justice. Ministry of Justice Announces Court and Legal Reform Program, July 25, 1964

1964 Constitution
Official and popular reaction to the new Constitution, which the King signed October 1, has been generally positive. Although information available from the provinces is fragmentary, it appears that there as well as in Kabul a significant portion of the populace understands the import of this reformative document. This segment appears heartened by its relatively liberal provisions as well as by the belief that the behavior of the Loya Jirga while adopting the Constitution in Kabul (A-141) indicates that Afghanistan is prepared for the experiment in democracy entailed in the Constitution. Proclamation of and Reaction to New Constitution, Oct. 10, 1964

Despite the fact that the new constitution has effectively removed powerful members of the Royal Family from the political scene and that many of its provisions aimed at social improvement represent marked departures from the traditional habits, customs and mores of this bastion of Muslim conservatism, the passage of the Constitution from the first draft to promulgation was a calm one. Politico-Economic Assessment, Jan. 23, 1965

Establishment of Parliamentary System
[I]t is interesting to note that the small group which Hamidullah reports has been formed by the King as a means of combating Soviet influences seems to be more or less the same informal group as was active last summer in assuring that the constitution passed smoothly through the Loya Jirga. The Embassy suspects that this group may now have a comparable function on the internal political scene, namely that of assuring that the parliamentary elections scheduled for next September do not produce too independent or headstrong a legislature. Hamidullah has himself commented privately to the Embassy that the new parliament would have to be controlled in somewhat the same way as the former legislature, since Afghanistan is not yet ready for real democracy. Comments by Mohammedzai Leaders on Soviet Influence and Royal Preoccupation with Afghanistan's Position, March 23, 1965

The Law on Basic Administration of the State, promulgated last October, provided the framework for the reorganization of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the RGA in accordance with the 1964 Constitution. ... The organization of the Cabinet, Parliament, Provincial Councils and especially the provincial administration are all carefully defined in the law. The authority and character of the Executive Branch are also defined, as are the responsibilities of each Cabinet Minister; the provinces are subdivided into sub-provinces, counties and boroughs; and the organizational structure of the provincial government is explained. Law on Basic Administration of the State, May 5, 1966

By the end of 1972, after nearly a decade of trial and error, King Zahir's "experiment" with parliamentary government has reached a standstill. Afghanistan's political system, despite its modern trappings, continued to operate more along tribal than parliamentary lines. ... Each of the last three governments under the 1964 Constitution had been paralyzed by, and eventually succumbed to, the deadlock with the Parliament and the chaos in the Cabinet which appear to be inherent in the system. ... King Zahir's blueprint for democracy was to provide a representative parliamentary system over which he could retain absolute control. With the King remaining aloof from the daily governmental process and refraining from direct exercise of his powers, the Afghans would learn over time to operate the system responsibly, while the King retained the necesary power to ensure stability during the transition period. ... Both the executive and legislative branches look to the King for direction, support, and authority. When the King wishes a bill to pass, he is able to persuade the deputies to pass it. when the deputies oppose a government proposal, they complain directly to the King to have it stopped. As the King has endeavored to stay aloof from day-to-day operations, the result has been long periods of government paralysis punctuated by royal action. ... Despite its trappings of parliamentary democracy, the Government in Afghanistan until recently revealed many of the characteristics of an absolute monarchy run along Afghanistan's traditional tribal jirgah lines. Afghanistan: Both Government and Political System Face Trial, March 30, 1973

Provincial Reorganization
The reorganization of Afghanistan's provinces and local government was effective last March 21, the beginning of the Afghan year. Since then, and after making several changes, provincial boundaries have been firmly established. ... Article 43 of the new Constitution provides that one member of the lower house of Parliament will be elected from each constituency. The number of constituencies and their boundaries is left to be determined by law. In general each constituency will coincide with an ususwali, the largest subdivision of a province and governed by an uluswas (formerly known as a hakim). Many, but not all, ususwalis are further divided into allaqadaris. Allaqadaris, each of which is governed by an allaqadar, will usually not be large enough to be separate constituencies. There may be exceptions in cases where allaqadaris are directly under the provincial governor, as sometimes happens. Thus, the number of uluswalis in a given ethnic region and also their boundaries will determine to a large extent how well the ethnic group concerned will be represented in the new Parliament to be elected in a year's time. Afghanistan's New Administrative Boundaries and Organization, Oct. 10, 1964

Law No. 2, dealing with the administration of government in the provinces, establishes the line of organization for provincial administrative assemblies. In effect, this is a revised type of governor's council or cabinet, with representation headed by the governor, the sub-governor and the chief accountant and security commander of the province. In effect, there is thus established in the province in the office of the governor (Ministry of Interior) with other central ministry officials also stationed in a given province. Transmittal of New Legislation Pertaining to the Ministry of Justice and Provincial Administration, April 20, 1965

Reorganization of the Ministry of Justice
Shafiq said that the Ministry of Justice was being reorganized and its authority being expanded. Under the new Constitution, there will be a separate judiciary, prosecution will be separated from the police function, and an office of attorney general will be created which will enjoy considerable authority. (At present each Ministry has its own attorney's office.) The office of the attorney general will be patterned after that of the United States. It will concentrate on crime and investigation and will also supervise prisons. The Ministry of the Interior, which Shafiq said had not yet been informed of these plans, would retain the job of keeping the peace. The Ministry of Justice would also be responsible for drafting new legislation. ... Describing the size of the existing court establishment for which the Ministry of Justice is now responsible, Shafiq said that there are six courts in Kabul dealing with administrative and commercial affairs, 20 high courts, and a total of 300 courts in all of Afghanistan, each of which employs from three to five persons; there is also the Supreme Court which will have expanded prestige and functions under the new Constitution. Plans of Ministry of Justice: Request for U.S. Assistance, Feb. 16, 1964

Two provisions inherent in the new Constitution especially will require appropriate legal institutions to make them effective. One is the requirement that "due process" will be followed in judicial proceedings, and the other is the "presumption of innocence" of the defendant in criminal cases. Since under traditional court proceedings persons charged with crimes bore the whole burden of proving themselves innocent, no elaborate investigative appratus was needed by the government. Further Progress in Reorganization in Ministry of Justice, May 9, 1964

An attorney general's office is to be established within the Ministry of Justice. The attorney general would be assisted by an appropriate staff and would have offices in the provinces. Leaving the police to concentrate on crime prevention, attorney general staff members would investigate all crimes as soon as they are discovered, assemble evidence, and determine whether and how to prosecute the case before the courts. The attorney general's office would have sufficient authority and facilities to perform its functions as investigator and prosecutor. It is not known whether or not a state defender's office or some similar agency will be established to protect the interests of those charged with crimes, but plans do provide for the training and use of defense attorneys in court cases. Further Progress in Reorganization in Ministry of Justice, May 9, 1964

Law No. 1 provides for the establishment of a "Department for the Administration of Government Cases." Along lines roughly equivalent to the U.S. Office of the Solicitor-General, this law establishes routines for the representation of cases in which the RGA is a party, involving suits versus private persons. Transmittal of New Legislation Pertaining to the Ministry of Justice and Provincial Administration, April 20, 1965

An item of legislation entitled "Administration of Judgments and Law-Making," Law No. 3, sets up an organization within the Ministry of Justice which will serve as a type of legislative reference service, but from the language of the legislation may go beyond that role in actually drafting laws and regulations to [be] brought before the "Shora", the lower house of the national legislature. Transmittal of New Legislation Pertaining to the Ministry of Justice and Provincial Administration, April 20, 1965

A final item of legislation is contained in Law No. 4 "Organization of the Attorney-General's Office." The title is somewhat misleading, perhaps, in that apart from setting out the organization of this new government entity under the Ministry of Justice, this legislation also establishes the lines of authority of the attorney-general's office vis-a-vis the police. It also contains certain civil rights provisions, as in Article 19 in that a citizen may not be held more than 48 hours without specific court permission - presumably without having been specifically charged. Transmittal of New Legislation Pertaining to the Ministry of Justice and Provincial Administration, April 20, 1965

Reorganization of the Courts
According to present plans, a system of courts on four levels is to be established. District courts of the kind presently in existence, which meet as the need arises in mosques and other public buildings, will be increased in number. ... Above them will be one provincial court for each of the twenty-nine recently constituted provinces. Provincial courts may have original jurisdiction in more important or serious cases. At the next higher level will be seven appellate courts. The Supreme Court will stand immediately above the appellate courts and will have nine members, probably appointed by the King on the nomination of the Prime Minister for long terms but not for life. Judges at lower levels would also be appointed for fixed terms. As yet undefined measures would be taken to protect the independence of the judiciary. Further Progress in Reorganization in Ministry of Justice, May 9, 1964

We fully agree with CT view that Afghan request for assistance in legal and judicial field could provide unique opportunity for US influence in this important area. Confidential Telegram from State Department, May 5, 1964

The Justice official responded in some detail to a query as to what provisions are to be made for defense counsel, in the midst of all the activity surrounding creation of an office of attorney-general. Kamawi admiitted that this represented a problem, but said that a law approved by the Cabinet would shortly be published which would provide for the establishment of an organized bar. Kamawi pointed out that there are innumnerable persons around the country, admittedly untrained, who have long practiced what he termed "Afghan common law." Comments of Deputy Minister of Justice on Judicial Reforms, Feb. 16, 1965

The Afghan judicial system has not changed appreciably despite the enactment of the Constitution in October 1964. Grandiose plans to enlarge the court system, expand the Ministry of Justice to train personnel, draft new codes and administer the new system were drawn up and announced in the belief that the Ministry would be the best place to fashion the independent judiciary envisaged by the Constitution. Further, criminal court procedures were to be greatly modified so as to give the Ministry of Justice direct control over police investigations, arrests and indictments. While the Ministry was slightly expanded, some personnel trained and numerous codes drafted, the court system has been only slightly improved, not enlarged, and the Ministry of Interior retains control over criminal matters. The Afghan people do not yet appear ready for such sweeping changes and have done little in the provinces to cooperate with the new Justice officials in the places where they have appeared. Judicial Reform Slows Down, Dec. 19, 1966

Social Guidance Department
The Social Guidance Department, therefore, was entrusted in 1951 with the task of keeping an eye on the mullahs, of trying to use them as propaganda instruments for the regime, and through them to obtain greater influence over the populace at large. ... Since the Ministry of Education controls the teaching profession, it would appear that the government consciously or unconsciously has a dichotomous approach. On the one hand, it is working through the Social Guidance Department to foster support among the mullahs while, on the other hand, giving somewhat freer expression of support for reform among other branches of the government where the officials are working or will be recruited. Presumably the government's pressure on the mullahs and freedom of expression will grow when the King agrees that the time has come to promulgate the new draft constitution. Social Guidance Department and Reform, Feb. 12, 1964

Freedom of Speech
The current criticism against the draft press law (A-299, February 27, 1965) indicates that some of the intelligensia have not given up all hope of reform, but still believe that pressure can be exerted to amend draft legislation in a manner that will be conducive to greater liberalism in this country. Others of the intelligensia, although skeptical of the government's bona fides, nevertheless are preparing to take advantage of whatever additional freedoms of speech and assembly that may be granted to them eventually under the reform program (A-275, February 6, 1965). Expression of Discontent re Reform Program, March 9, 1965

The Daud government was unpopular because of the harshness and avarice of its officials at the local level. In his own area, Mukkur, he could testify that for every one afghani that was due to the government in taxes, 8 1/2 afghanis were extorted by the officials; for example, water for irrigation, supposedly to be supplied as a matter of course at a nominal rate, would not be supplied to farmers unless they paid money to the officials for this privilege. Innocent persons were arrested in the wake of a crime and then forced to buy their freedom from jail. The former Governor of Baghlan had fired a hakim who refused to turn his daughter over to the pleasures of the Governor. Taraki asserted that many of these abuses could be terminated or alleviated if there were a free press ... Additional Commentary on Afghan Political Developments, Dec. 7, 1963

Abdul Basir HAKIMI, recently appointed Acting Director-General of Security in the Ministry of the Interior, told Embassy officers on January 13 that Prime Minister YUSUF is too afraid of former Prime Minister DAUD to release the 475 political prisoners still held. Comments of Official of Ministry of Interior, January 18, 1964

Hashim related the foregoing to the developing political system in Afghanistan. He said that Afghanistan's present system of development, and the pressures on the country from without, stipulated that the government should advance cautiously into the area of permissive political activity. It would be best, he said, if only one political party (pro-government) were established under the new Constitution. The number of intellectuals is too small to permit their diffusion into two or more parties which would have a divisive influence at a time when domestic unity is required. An opposition party would be irresponsible, but might be permitted after a few years. Hasihm added that Prime Minister Yusuf, with whom Hashim worked closely when Yusuf was Minister of Mines and Industry, beleives in a program as just described. Mines and Industry Official Comments on Soviet Aid and Related Political Aspects, March 16, 1965

Students appeared lack direction and organization, mainly shouting defiance of authority and desire hear parliamentary debate despite government ban. No evidence anti-foreign bias or attacks on foreign offices, including USAID, located along scene of action. SITREP on Student Demonstrations, Oct. 25, 1965

Role of Islamic Law
Thirty Afghan judges have returned from Cairo after a study and observation tour and have returned to work, mostly in the Kabul area. In-service training is planned for them, as well as for other Justice Ministry officials. Legal reforms are expected to be based upon and drawn from Koranic Law and will utilize models taken from other Muslim countries. Justice Ministry Continues Effort to Establish Modern Judicial System to Implement New Constitution, August 22, 1964

Shafiq expresssed special satisfaction over approval Art 102 which represents "historical change" since where Constitution silent it permits courts apply "principles" Hanafite jurisprudence rather than searching for precedents out of dim past. Confidential Telegram from Kabul Embassy, Sept. 17, 1964

Founders of the Afghan judiciary envisioned a system whereby cases would be adjudicated first on the basis of the Hanafi code of jurisprudcence and the Constitution and second on the growing body of secular law passed by the Parliament. Since Article 64 of the Constitution prohibits laws contrary to the basic principles of Islam, secular law in theory would fill the gaps in religious law and there would be few conflicts in the law. ... Mr. Williams states, on the other hand, "My view is that the system is equally at fault because the new secular laws are borrowed from Western countries and do not reflect Islamic cultural patterns -- hence no one really obeys them and judges do not understand how to apply them. The greatest need is for laws that are developed locally in response to local needs and reflecting local practices rather than copied from Western codes." A Review of the Afghan Judiciary, July 18, 1971


Official Languages
There are some indications that the RGA may intend to place more emphasis on Pushtu, but it is doubted that a really serious effort in this direction will be made. It seems more likely that limited bows to Pushtu will be made, perhaps to allay the apprehensions of those Pushtuns who fear that the downgrading of Pushtunistan, particularly as evidenced in the reduction in propaganda, may foreshadow a further decline in RGA support for Pushtu language and culture in Afghanistan. Indications that RGA May Place More Emphasis on Pushtu, July 13, 1963

Dr. Abdul Zaher, President of the National Assembly and Chairman of the Constitutional Advisory Commission, told the DCM shortly before the Commission completed its work on May 14 that the draft Constitution envisages a significant change concerning language policy. Dr. Zaher said that there would be, as there is now, two official languages, Pashtu and Farsi, but the latter henceforth would be "dahri." ... Differences over language, which are closely correlated to differences between the dominant Pashtuns and the subordinate Farsi-speaking ethnic groups, came to a head within the Commission during March when a Pashtun member of the Commission suggested that the draft Constitution employ phraseology which would commit the government to support the purity of Pashtu and emphasize its use as a national language. "Farsi-Dahri" to be Official Language, May 23, 1964

In fulfillment of Article 35 of the new constitution, the Prime Minister has given orders, announced in the press November 4, for the preparation of a program for the promotion of the Pushtu language. ... Among the activities forseen are the translation of an increased number of foreign works into Pushtu, the improvement of Pushtu teaching methods, the sending of Pushtu scholars abroad to study philology, and the encouragement of artistic performances in Pushtu. RGA to Prepare "Comprehensive Program" to Promote Pushtu Language, Nov. 14, 1964

Women's Rights
This proposal has excited considerable local comment to the effect that it represents a second major move in the direction of mordernization parallel to the removal of the chadri (the head-to-toe covering for females) in 1959. Although the proposal does not call for permitting women to attend Fateh ceremonies together with men, it is a significant departure from traditional Moslem religious practice, and especially noteworthy in a country in which the chadri was obligatory until four years ago. It undoubtedly reflects a genuine RGA desire to continue the process of feminine emancipation begun under former Prime Minister Daud. Proposal to Permit Women to Hold Mourning Ceremonies (Fateh) in Kabul Mosques, July 14, 1963

One of the feminine members of the Jirga nearly caused a commotion at the Jirga when she proposed that the Constitution be amended to contain specific language guaranteeing the political and social rights of women (A-141). The Institute's meeting suggests that some feminists plan to awaken greater interest among women on this issue and that Watan is prepared to assist this development. Proclamation of and Reaction to New Constitution, Oct. 10, 1964

These first four elections are to be held in the provincial capitals of Jalalabad and Kunduz, plus two other unspecified towns and are to be by secret ballot with women encouraged for the first time to vote. It is understood that the latter development has been acceded to by the Prime Minister reluctantly at the behest of Shafiq and Kayeum, because he was said to fear criticism from conservative elements. However, the Kayeum-Shaifq view has prevailed, at least for the present, that the momentum of recent reform measures must be maintained and that assuring women the right to vote is a next logical step. Municipal Elections Slated as Trial Runs, April 3, 1965

Delegation five prominent Afghan women departed March 7 for three-week visit Communist China at invitation National Federation Chinese Women to observe women's organizations and schools. Group includes Mrs. Saleha Etemadi, President Afghan Women's Institute, and Mrs. Rona Farhadi, wife of MFA DIRGEN Polaff. Comment: visit reflects continuing Chicom campaign to woo Afghans with cultural exchange. Afghan Women Visit Communist China, March 10, 1966

Religious Conservatism
Dr. Abdul Kayeum, governor of Girishk and Vice-President of the Helmand Valley Authority, recently told an American that religious fanaticism in the Kandahar area of Southern Afghanistan presents a possible serious threat to the American Community in the area. He added that there has been no progress in removing the veil in Kandahar since the December 1959 riots primarily because the present Governor is unsuitable. ... The embassy believes that Dr. Kayeum has exaggerated the dangers to the American community in the South; somewhat overstated the lack of progress in removing the veil; and greatly oversimplified the causes for the Kandahar area's continued religious conservatism. Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Abdul Kayeum, Nov 23, 1962

In wake of Pakistan disturbances, certain groups in Kabul have been attempting to stir interest in blasphemous book "Turkish Art of Love" by a "Dr. Pinhas". So far provocateurs have had little success although small demonstration took place Jan. 17. Book "Turkish Book of Love," January 18, 1971

Believe RGA action most unfortunate, but agree that USG role is to remind RGA of negative impact on U.S. public when it becomes known that RGA has deliberately demolished only Christian edifice in Afghanistan. Christian Community Church, Feb. 27, 1973

[N]ow appears likely that private Protestant missionary-supported medical assistance programs in Afghanistan (Noor Eye Clinic and medical assistance program) will be terminated by RGA on grounds that medical personnel have engaged in illegal missionary activity. Community Christian Church and Related Religious Organizations, March 30, 1973

Khalili explained ... that he was personally intensely interested in the "Pan Islamic" movement, of which he was an enthusiastic supporter and advocate, from the standpoint of Afghan interest. He held forth at some length on this topic. Afghans were "working closely" with likeminded elements in other Islamic countries, espeically with "Iranian friends," to promote the idea of Pan-Islamic unity and cooperation, and he proposed to continue in that direction with such Middle East leaders as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hussain of Jordan. He freely acknowledged Pan-Islamism to be a deliberate effort by "conservative interests" in the Middle East to counteract the influence and power of adventurist, left-leaning Nasserism. Conversation with Erstwhile Conservative Political Leader Khalilullah Khalili, Lately Turned Diplomat, March 17, 1966

In the course of a courtesy call today, the new Afghan Ambassador Khalilullah KHALILI, told me he had discussed with King Faisal, on the occasion of his recent presentation of credentials to the King, the Afghan Government's attitude toward Islamic solidarity. ... With the Soviet Union on its northern flank and exercising a great attraction on Afghan youth, the GOA cannot afford publicly to espouse policies which are objectionable to the USSR. One such item is King Faisal's "Islamic Solidarity" concept. Thus, while the GOA favors greater Islamic solidarity and privately wishes the King well in his efforts to forge it, the GOA cannot at this time openly support the concept. Afghan Ambassador's Comments on Islamic Solidarity, May 18, 1966


Conversation after dinner turned to Soviet relations, being introduced by my remarks earlier in the evening to Amin Etemadi, expressing some surprise that an Afghan women's delegation, including his own wife, should be duped into attending the Communist front women's conference in Moscow. This conference was obviously being broadcast earlier in the evening from conference participants who were obviously parroting the communist line. I expressed the view that for a country that professed to bend over backwards to be neutral, it did not seem very fitting for Afghans voluntarily to associate themselves with such an unneutral conference. ... In an attempt to point out that they did do things that were extremely difficult to explain to the communists, Abdul Hai remarked that, as an example, the Russians could not understand Afghanistan's accepting such operatations as the Peace Corps. No matter what we all know about the objectives of the Peace Corps, the Soviets considered it penetration and were suspicious of Afghanistan for engaging in these and other activities that seemed to give proof of their Western orientation. I saw no point in allowing him to equate U.S. activities in Afghanistan of such an obvious philanthropic type as the Peace Corps with communist tactics directed at subversion and told him very straightforwardly that, although some might consider it a very smug thing to say, one just had to recognize that there was a vast difference between the motivation of the United States and the Soviets in carrying out these various activities. ... He said Afghanistan was really in a very frightening position. They had to maintain the facade of friendliness with the Soviets, for they really feared what the results would be if they overstepped the bounds of propriety and antagonized the Soviets. Memorandum of Converation with Abdul Hai Aziz, June 25, 1963

An official of the Ministry of Justice who is a Mohammedzai, or member of the extended Royal Family, and has a wide range of contacts expressed growing concern over Soviet influence in Afghanistan to the drafting officer March 8, 1965. ... He said that Soviet pressure on the Afghan government is increasing and predicted that Afghanistan could be reduced to helplessness within the next year, although he continues to believe that effective counteraction is possible. ... The source expressed his belief that the Soviet Embassy supports its "proteges" whereas the American Embassy does not. As a result, those associated with the Soviets have considerable influence. Moreover, the Soviets have demonstrated the ability to change the persuasion of key figures. ... The source said that he and his group had decided to change their tactics vis-a-vis the Soviet Embassy in view of increasing Soviet influence. Previously they have tended to evade the numerous and persistent attempts of Soviet officials to cultivate them. Now the group has decided to associate with the Soviets more often in a bid to protect themselves from attack and to be better able to work against the Soviets. Concern over Soviet Influence, March 13, 1965

A USAID officer was informed March 26th that Lt. Gen Mohammed ALI, commander of the Afghan Gendermerie under the Minister of the Interior, would depart Kabul March 31st for a six day visit to Moscow. According to the informant, Mohammed Mussa Naimi, "chief commissioner" (as he rendered his title) of the security and criminal division of police at Mazar-i-Sharif, the visiting party would comprise five people including Naimi. ... It is assumed that the other RGA officials going on the trip have similarly been invited by their "opposite numbers". Afghan Gendarmerie Commander Reportedly to Visit Moscow, March 30, 1965

The Soviet Union has a number of objectives deleterious to U.S. interests and has given its relations with Afghanistan a high priority -- over a billion dollars in economic and military aid. The Soviets have had the immediate aims of limiting U.S. influence and any sort of Western alignment. In the longer run, the USSR probably aspires to control the area, either directly or indirectly through a sympathetic leftist regime, in pursuance of its historic aim of a direct land link with the sub-continent and access to the Indian Ocean. It is likely the Soviet Union expects to achieve this central objective without the use of force. Rather, it probably hopes that current efforts to establish clandestine intelligence and political action resources, its strong position within the Afghan military forces, the cautious encouragement of a socialist bias in the nation's economic life, its favorable position in Afghan trade, the careful dissemination of propaganda, and the opportunitites offered by training hundreds of Afghans will pave the way for Soviet success. Afghanistan: A Policy Review, Oct 24, 1968

Believe the Department should be aware that information reaching us from both overt and covert sources reveals a rash of rumor that what is taking place in Afghanistan is result of adriot US engineering. This belief being disseminated by both friends and antagonists for quite different reasons. Telegram from Kabul Embassy, March 13, 1963

Rasul has proven most helpful in establishing better working relationships for the CARE-MEDICO mission in Kabul and is believed to be quite western in his orientation and outlook. New Afghan Ambassadors Reported Assigned, April 6, 1965

Some weeks ago an Ariana plane unloaded eight boxes in Kandahar, each of which contained an American 50 caliber machine gun. One of the boxes was addressed to the Iranian Air Force in Tehran but the other seven had no addresses. ... As a result of the investigation, it appears that the guns were part of a larger shipment from the United States consigned to the Iranian Air Force in Tehran. At Frankfort, Germany Pan American Airlines loaded the guns onto a plane of Ariana/Afghan Airlines destined for Beirut, Tehran and Kandahar. At Beirut the original shipment in three large packages had to be broken in order to facilitate balanced loading of the plane. As a result, eight boxes which had been tied together were separated and by mistake remained on the plane in Tehran. Misrouting of U.S. Machine Guns to Afghanistan, March 14, 1968

The Youth Committee and Country Team believe that we have a fair understanding of the political and social attitudes of youth and their likely political effect in the next few years within the context of the existing power structure. Impact of Youth and the U.S. National Interest, April 15, 1970

The Potential Leaders Biographic Reporting List (PLBRL) submitted in A-67 of April 24, 1969, provided an excellent guide to Afghanistan's potential leaders and was very much appreciated. The response from the Post to the second cycle of the program was outstanding and surpassed the equally excellent response received for the initial cycle. Of the 147 individuals on the list, reporting has been received on approximately fifty-one percent. Appraisal of Reporting Response to the 1969-70 PLBRL for Afghanistan, Feb 2, 1971

Community files have been screened to determine the extent and quality of information currently available on the 1971-72 PLBRL personalities. A description of the file holdings by individual personality is attached, so that the Post can focus its attention and collection efforts on filling existing gaps and avoiding duplication of information already in file. For the sake of consistency the positions of the PLBRL personalities remain as stated in your A-31. Commentary on the 1971-72 PLBRL for Afghanistan, August 5, 1971

As he was leaving the house, he said -- seemingly in jest -- that the Moslem Youth had the weapons to fight the Russians. As proof he pulled an automatic pistol (about 25 cal.) from his belt, smiled, and waved it for me to see. I asked if it was loaded; he said yes and that they had a lot more. Another smile. As he left he promised to bring me some "documents" -- samples of the kind of literature he and his groups were circulating. He returned as promised a week later. In the meantime, the Embassy had the opportunity to check his bona fides; he could have been a provacateur, but from Embassy files he appeared to be a genuine young fanatic. Merajuddin: Portrait of a Moslem Youth Extremist, May 29, 1972

Plot to Remove Daud
Dept concerned at obvious risk if Daud comes to suspect that Emb involved in any effort remove him or even that Emb is aware of the effort. Emb should give no encouragement or promises, no matter how conditioned, of US support inthe event of further approaches of this nature. At same time we realize report in REFTEL reflects the temper of segment of Royal Family and other important elements in Afghanistan, and that US must stay on tip of situation in order to be prepared for Daud's possible fall. You and CAS [CIA HQ] should work out most appropriate means maintaining coverage. Dept strongly of opinion USAID channel should not be used. Secret LIMDIS Telegram from WASHDC, Oct. 18, 1962

In view recent reports from Kabul request Embs assessment of Soviet reaction to possible change of Govt in Afghanistan involving replacement Primin Daud by other members of Royal Family would would strive steer more truly neutral course for Afghanistan. Possible change could be peaceful but might lead to internal struggle involving armed forces. Reason for attempted change would be concern various elements over Afghan drift toward Soviet sphere under present leadership. Telegram from WASHDC to Moscow Embassy, Oct. 18, 1962

Any change in Afghan leadership would immediately engage intense Soviet attention. ... If change should involve internal armed struggle, Emb assumes Soviets would be prepared respond quickly to appeal for assistance from Daud and/or other leadership elements Soviets consider friendly toward themselves, if claim were raised that Daud remained legitimate PriMin. Telegram from Moscow Embassy, Oct. 21, 1962

Second Five-Year Plan
The US will not this year make a long-term commitment as this phrase is understood in the legislation passed last year. Telegram from Dean Rusk, June 13, 1962

While we are hopeful of riding out the storm successfully, now is not the time for further major new approaches to the Afghan aid program. He remarked rather than the U.S. making new declarations of policy, it might be helpful if Afghan leaders publicly noted U.S. efforts. U.S. Aid Policy to Afghanistan, July 2, 1962

This sense of rejection cannot be fully appreciated without drawing attention to a certain amount of history in U.S.-Afghan aid relations. In the ensuing years since 1954 the U.S. has developed its own rationale and justification for refusing to give to Afghanistan the assistance which they once desired in developing their instruments of national security. Only the intervening years since that decision was made has revealed how deeply this has affected the trend of events in Afghanistan. There were those who reasoned in 1954 that the desire to remain uncommitted would lead the Afghans to remain in a medieval posture so far as their military development was concerned rather than turn to the Soviets for aid when it was refused by the West. The total envelopment of the military establishment by the Russians in the last eight years has been the answer to those who thought that the Afghans would not dare turn to the traditional aggressors from the north lest they place their independence in jeopardy. ... They naively reason that communist influence can be blunted in a country like Afghanistan by the exercise of traditional native wit plus their passionate dedication to independence and unassailable social institutions. Conference with Minister of Mines and Industries and Acting Minister of Educaton, Dr. Mohammed Yusuf, and Minister of Planning, Abdul Hai Aziz, Sept. 9, 1962

During his call on Mr. Talbot, the Ambassador asked whether a decision had been made on the level of U.S. economic assistance. He noted that in his presentation of the Second Five-Year Plan to the National Assembly, Prime Minister Daud had mentioned that the U.S. share would be $350,000,000. Mr. Talbot said the U.S. would not extend a long term commitment, as such, to the RGA but that we were vitally interested in the Plan. We would take on certain projects which in effect are multi-year commitments. However, no over-all level of aid had been set. The important aspect, he noted, was that the U.S. fully intended to participate in Afghan development to the extent of "the limits which the RGA imposes on us." U.S. Aid to Afghanistan; Invitations for King Zahir and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, May 8, 1962

[T]he reporting officer finally asked point blank why the USSR should be so concerned about the size of the United States aid effort here since many observers felt the Soviet Union would be the gainer from any alleged American default. Andreev replied that because of our alleged failure to contribute enough, the Afghan Government keeps seeking more help from the USSR to make up the difference. Soviet Diplomat Shows Concern About the United States Aid Program in Afghanistan, Feb. 18, 1963

Since existing Afghan police "illiterate, underpaid and hopeless," special police unit should be created which could benefit from FRG assistance. Unit would consist 600-800 man force whose members must be literate and would receive better pay and employment conditions than regular police. Telegram from Kabul Embassy, April 30, 1964

Kabul-Kandahar Highway
We all agree that present situation unsatisfactory and importance road to US position in Afghanistan. Our objective is to complete it. Secret Telegram from WASHDC, Nov. 17, 1962

Evaluation current situation and recommendations regarding K-K Road construction conveyed ref cables much appreciated. State/AID/Wash recognize and are sympathetic with circumstances which support CT recommendation for immediate decision to undertake completion of this construction via Iran, if necessary. In view current efforts under Iranian good offices, we do not at this time believe it appropriate to change existing basic policy for K-K road. ... In addition, Naim was informed at highest official levels that we would not increase use of Iranian route. Telegram from WASHDC, Oct. 18, 1962

The editorial notes that a "series of difficulties" have delayed construction but carefully avoids mentioning that the basic reason for any delays in construction was the Afghan closure of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in September 1961. It was the closure of the border and the consequent expense and difficulties in transporting over different routes -- e.g. through Iran -- the necessary supplies and equipment for road construction which resulted in AID's decision to asphalt sections leading from Kabul and Kandahar, and in the middle sections to construct an improved gravel road, so as to stay within the amount of funds obligated. Transportation: RGA May Press for Asphalting of Entire Kabul-Kandahar Highway, June 30, 1963

The Afghan Left
Madhoosh said that the incoherence and lack of purposeful direction on the part of the present government was creating a "vacuum", as he put it, which was encouraging the Left. He said that the youth of the country sensed that the leaders were not working energetically or systematically, and hence were turning toward the left, particularly in the University, since the left offered a more positive program. Expression of Discontent re Reform Program, March 9, 1965

The party is known as Khalq-e-Demokrasi, or People's Democratic Party. ... [Nur Mohammed] Taraki said that his party is designed primarily to assist the middle class, to elevate the lower ranks of the population, and to obtain assistance from the wealthier element for this purpose. The party's platform would be slightly left of center, he said, in order to pre-empt "that bastard" DAUD who, Taraki said, continues to talk of his fondness for "socialism" and will play an important political role at the appropriate time in the future. Taraki said that his party will advocate land reforms; land reform is required in Farah Province where there are large landholdings, he maintained, but thisis not an important problem elsewhere. Formation of Afghan Political Party Reported, March 20, 1965

He stated that a select group of University administrators, including the Rector, Dr. Samad Hamed and himself, now have compiled data which provides not only numbers but names as well. Hamidullah asserted that the problem has become so aggravated that he expects King Mohammed Zahir Shah will grant an audience to review the problem with Hamed and himself in the next week or so. He maintained that the "communist" infiltration, as he termed it, is concentrated in the Faculties of Letters and Medicine. In response to a question from the drafting officer, he said that so far as is known no faculty members are known to have affiliated with the group. Kabul University Dean Comments on Leftist Inroads, April 6, 1965

According to this report, based on information received from the Japanese Embassy in Kabul, this movement is comprised primarily of former Afghan resident students in the Soviet Union. Movement to Form an Underground Communist Party in Afghanistan, June 2, 1965

Science students demanded release Osman, return expelees and termination contracts German instructors and their replacement by Russians. ... Significant extent communist direction evident in Osman public announcement his communist affiliations and student insistence on substitution Russians for Germans. More Student Demonstrations, Dec. 15, 1965

In Farhadi's view the appearance of Khalq had played into the Government's hands by rudely shattering the illusions of many of the hitherto fairly homogeneous grouping of self-styled social democrats, modernists and liberals. ... In an ensuing discussion of Khalq Farhadi said it was obvious that the first issue had been completely written in Moscow. He said he had not yet had a chance to make a thorough study of the following issue but he believed it had been written in part locally. ... In response to my query, Farhadi said the Government would probably allow Khalq to continue publication "for a while", unless the paper went too far in its criticism of the Government and existing institutions. Maiwandwal and the Parliament, May 5, 1966

While burden of oratory remained anti-government and "anti-feudal," it took on alarming sectarian, class-oriented cast as agitators played on discrimination against Hazaras and Shias. Xenophobic theme also injected with US, UK, other western nations abused, USSR praised, Chicoms ignored. Parl and Student Disorders, Dec. 1, 1966

Although the Afghan Left remains small and fragmented, it has grown considerably over the years following the promulgation of Afghanistan's Constitution in 1964. Most observers accept the premise of a remark attributed to Sardar Abdul Wali, to the effect that if the mullahs were unleashed all leftists in the country would be dead within 24 hours. However, given this country's stormy history, and the memories of what happened here before when the populace took matters in its own hands, it is very doubtful that Abdul Wali or any member of the Royal Family would ever seriously consider such a move. At present, the Left probably has more nuisance value than anything else. The Afghan Left, May 22, 1973

Top Secret Telegram from Kabul Embassy, March 23, 1950

NAME, April 10, 1952

Communism in Afghanistan, April 5, 1952

Chief of Mission's Report to the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, on the Operation and Status of Foreign Aid Programs in Afghanistan, July-December 1953, Jan. 26, 1954


Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works.

Friday, 21 November 2014

QK Archives: Paul Wolfs work : Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession: Tribal Belt

' reproduced solely for educational purposes, this information is from the Paul Wolf work taken from the US National Archives. It is reproduced solely for educational purposes as original site is no longer available online'

Documents from the U.S. National Archives

Bajaur Bombing
Massacres of Powindahs
Public Demonstrations


On Friday, May 18, 1962 mobs in this city stoned the American Consulate, tore down the Consulate flag and destroyed it, severely damaged several cinemas and nearly destroyed one, stoned and attacked Radio Pakistan, broke almost all windows in Dean's Hotel, forced their way into the room occupied by the Dutch Ambassador and his wife and stole his clothing and money, completely destroyed at least two liquor stores, and did other damage. ... Prologue to events. On Wednesday, May 16 there were rumors that all shops and officies in Qissa Khwani Bazaar would close just before the Friday prayers on May 18 and would remain closed for the rest of the day. This was to be done in protest against a film on the life of the Prophet which was said to be planned by an Italian firm. No one took this very seriously because most of the shops and offices are regularly closed for that period each Friday. On Thursday, signs and posters appeared urging all shops to cooperate in this "hartal", not only in the City but also in the Cantonment Saddar Bazaar. Riots in Peshawar: A Description and Analysis, May 21, 1962

Beginning last week in May, press and radio started exploit Peshawar disturbances as manifestation Pushtun hatred of GOP military rule. Claim Paks attempted minimize magnitude riots, falsely attributed cause to foreign movie company activities, and discouraged Pak press coverage; GOP obliged use tanks and heavy weapons put down demonstrations and only in this way "prevented" attacks on American Consulate and British High Commissioner's office (no mention made of stoning of Consulate and flag mutilation); casualty toll has risen to 8 dead and 21 injured by Pak military action with over 350 arrests; absence Afghan Consulate in Peshawar deprives Pak propagandists of east scapegoat, obliging them fabricate story that demonstrations were against film company. ... CAS [CIA] reports that RGO sent 1500 men from Seventh Infantry Division and probably preparing some units of Mountain Division for return to Pak border in Chiga Serai area, in hopes exploiting any opportunities unrest in tribal area may present. Peshawar Riots, June 10, 1962

The reporting officer has now been told by four highly reputable officials that the DIK Commissioner was subjected to severe sniping, apparently in late May or early June. Unrest in South Waziristan Agency: Fragmentary Reports, July 16, 1962

On the morning of May 1 an infantry company began an exercise near the administrative border between the settled area and the Adam Khel Afridi tribal territory. Shortly afterwards a body of Afridi tribals appeared and in the ensuing skirmish, at least two soldiers were killed and others were wounded. The casualties of the Afridis are not known. Acts of Violence -- Attacks on Army Units, Murder, Kidnapping, Feuding -- Still Play Important Role in Frontier Life, May 13, 1963

According to Yusuf, the Political Agent had made funds available to an old and venerable malik, Malik Shahzada Khan Halimzai Mohmand, for the construction of a school and a hospital. The malik, who is also a member of the Agency Council, had started his construction without discussing the matter with other important maliks of the area. One of those maliks, Haji Abdullah Khan, who according to Yusuf is a sometime Afghan agent and is an enemy of Malik Shahzada, had objected to the project and warfare resulted. The tribals are equipped with mortars, Bren guns, grenades, plastic bombs, and, of course, rifles, and Yusuf stated that there had been a serious loss of life. Memorandum of Conversation with Mohammad Yusuf Mohmand, April 7, 1963

According available sources, tribal areas peaceful since beginning current emergency. Truce in inter-tribal disputes (TIGA) instituted by jirgahs throughout belt. Including suspension minor hostilities in progress between two Dir tribes. Pathans disappointed Afghan failure support jehad more vigorously, but report no Pushtunistan incitement from Afghans. Movements of 1500 Mujahis each from Dir and Swar reliably reported. Less reliable reports say 3000 Afridis in Rajastan sector. Volunteers from other tribal areas reportedly in Sialkot and Kashmir fronts, numbers unknown. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 22, 1965

Violence is not uncommon in the NWFP but the recent wave of murders, kidnappings, robberies and thefts, which has hit the region from Swabi to D. I. Khan is alarming the community. Government authorities are trying their best to cope with the situation but because of the explosive nature of the Pathan society they find it difficult to maintain law and order. Tribal feuds in the region still exact their victims and with firearms easily available, the slightest provocation can lead to death. Police power often become ineffective since the law denies the authorities jurisdiction over tribal territory. The police force of the Superindendent of Police of Peshawar consists of 1,200 poorly trained constables whose pay is low and who, by the Superindendent's own admission, are easily corrupted. Police investigations are conducted by the interrogation and elimination process -- all suspects are beaten up until the guilty one breaks down and confesses. Attempts to arrest criminal suspects often lead to pitched battles between the police, the criminal and his relatives. ... Political rallies in the Frontier are often punctuated by rifle shots triggered by enthusiastic Pathans. It takes little imagination to visualize what the consequences to public order could be if hot Pathan tempers are flared up by inflammatory speech. In some cases, such as in Swabi and Swat, the carrying of arms has resulted in injuries and death. In both cases NAP (Wali) and PML (Qaiyum) followers were involved. Violence in the NWFP, May 14, 1970

Mohammad Yunus (protect) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Middle East, Arab States, Afghanistan and CENTO Affairs, reviewed with the reporting officer on February 23 the situation in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. ... Yunus asserted that the government was very concerned at repeated reports of foreign arms and money being distributed in both Baluchistan and the NWFP. He felt is was being done for obvious reasons: It is a cheap way for India to continue its efforts to dismember Pakistan and it serves the Soviet objective of creating yet another state or states which will be subject to Soviet influence. Should Baluchistan emerge as a separate pro-Soviet entity, he said, the Soviets would be in a position to force greater Afghanistan compliance with Soviet demands. Views of MFA Official on Pak/Afghan Relations and Situation in North West Frontier and Baluchistan, March 6, 1972

Bhutto has overthrown governments in Baluchistan and Frontier dominated by chief political rival to his own People's Party. ... While successful in first part of game plan against his major opponents, Bhutto is encountering difficulties in putting together pro-government coalition in two provinces although through patronage and coercion he should eventually succeed. Internal Political Developments: Bhutto's Political Coup, March 1, 1973

Unlike the other tribal agencies, Mohmand Agency has been without a security force, other than a few khassadars, since 1947. To remedy this situation, the government in early October, deployed elements of the Khyber Rifles (from the neighboring Khyber Agency) on the old British road and established positions of strength in Ikkaghund, Yusuf Khel and Kahakki. Other elements of the Khyber Rifles, joined by units of the Bajaur Scouts, established themselves along the route of the proposed new road between Nahakki and Nawagai. By the middle of the month pictures began to appear in the press showing Mohmand tribal youth in the Yusuf Khel offering themselves for recruitment for a new security force to be known as the Mohmand Rifles. ... The government's decision to open up Mohmand Agency has been received with mixed feelings by tribal leaders in the agency. There reportedly is considerable dissatisfaction among maliks in both the Upper and Lower Mohmand regions with the government's deployment of elements of the Khyber Rifles and Bajaur Scouts to the agency. It is their feeling that the government has shown itself to be hostile to the Mohmands by moving an outside force into the agency instead of recruiting a new force entirely from among the Mohmands themselves. GOP Begins Penetration of Mohmand Agency, Nov. 14, 1973

Bajaur Bombing
A series of circumstances over the past week has raised suspicions that local elements of the Pakistan Army may have experienced some sort of "flap" in recent days. The circumstances included: an assemblage of Frontier area Army brigade commanders here on the 24th and 25th; the non-attendance of any senior Army officers at the Commerce College dedication by Miss Fatima Jinnah on the 25th, an event for which seats had been reserved for them on the dias; the last minute cancellation of a big Armored Corps parade at Nowshera on the 26th at which the Commander-in-Chief, General MUHAMMAD MUSA, was to have been the chief guest; the disappearance and protracted absence of one of the local division's infantry battalions. Whether all these circumstances were connected or not, my suspicions have now been confirmed by the Consulate's Political Assistant, Col. KHUSHWAQT-UL-MULK. During a visit with Col. Khushwaqt on the 26th, he reported that he had just received two definite indications that a disturbance had occurred recently in troublesome Bajaur, between Dir State and the Pak-Afghan border. One of the Colonel's friends who had reached Peshawar that day after an overland journey from Chitral had said that he had heard reports in Dir City to the effect that "a group of Masuds" had been fired upon in Bajaur. Several Masuds reportedly had been killed in the skirmish. Reports of a Minor Skirmish in Bajaur and of Dissatisfaction of Dir Elders with the Young Nawab, Oct. 30, 1962

American civilian armament specialist (imperative protect source) assigned Air Force MAAG Peshawar obtained following detailed account last night from PAF pilot friend who considered fully informed and reliable source. Local disturbance broke out between April 6 and 8. When political agents unable cope with situation PAF called in perform daily reconnaissances including daily air drop leaflets approx April 9-11 calling for ceasefire. On fourth day, (probably April 12) tribals fired on Pak planes damaging wing of one F-86 with "bazooka" shells. (American civilian inspected plane this morning in PAF station hangar Peshawar, which "off limits" to MAAG personnel until today, and personally verified wing damage. Civilian also obtained identification of pilot as Squadron Leader Rehmat Khan who is friend of Con officers, son of Nawab of Tank and happened participate in last important PAF airstrike on tribal territory late 1961). According PAF source, damage to F-86 deeply offended PAF which delivered "4-hour ultimatum" to tribals concerned (whether on own hook or higher authority unknown) and then carried out punitive attack on homestead of one offending Malik (presumably afternoon April 13) using rockets and napalm. Information received from AmCon Peshawar, April 21, 1963

News of tribal trouble and PAF air action Bajaur becoming common knowledge and subject muted conversation Peshawar, particularly among newsmen who obviously being restrained from reporting events known to them and others. ... Source stated dissidents being led by Dilawar Khan, believed by consulate to be one of two leading Bajaur Maliks who cooperated with GOP in ambushing and repulsing Afghan Lashkar September 1960. Source opined Afghan agents playing at most minor role in fomenting latest disturbances Bajaur. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 25, 1963

The "Conquerer of Bajaur" then asserted that he and the Army officer, Lt. Colonel ABDUL QARIM, now the Commandant of the Bajaur Scouts, had used generous bribes and impressive threats to induce the two maliks to cooperate with them in preparing an ambush. The ambush was laid and, with the "help" of a detachment of the Baluch Regiment Special Force from Cherat, over 1200 of the Afghan lashkar had been killed with a loss of "about eighty of us." Events Which Led to Ambush of Afghan Lashkar in Bajaur in September 1960, as Described by the "Conqueror of Bajaur," April 25, 1963.

Massacres of Powindahs
Mortars, machineguns and rifles had been ordered to be "zeroed in" on one section of the defile. Despite the usual warnings a long powindah caravan started moving one night silently through the defile. Someone -- the APA later blamed the captain, and the captain of the APA -- ordered the troops to open fire in the dark. In the morning, according to Iftikhar and Askar Ali, when the Scouts looked out on the carnage they had caused -- including the bodies of some women and children -- they were so appalled that about a dozen of them deserted with their rifles and have not yet been apprehended. Peshawar Observers See Dangerous Possibilities in Powindah Situation, Describe Incidents of Last Fall, Sept. 1, 1962

On November 23, traveling in small family groups, the Powindahs passed witnin artillery randge of the Pakistan militia stationed around Gul Kuch. Supposedly the militia artillery opened fire at long range without warning, causing numerous casualties among the family groups who then withdrew to their previous camping sites around the Gumal. Reported Shelling of Powindahs by Pak Militia Artillery, Dec. 16, 1963

Public Demonstrations
Evidence seems to be mounting to support the conclusion that communist elements have in fact exploited the student situation in the Frontier area. Evidence from Top Police Official and Others that Communists May Have Instigated Recent Student Disturbances in Peshawar, March 13, 1965

Demonstration by Christian community Rawalpindi resulted in death three persons August 30. GOP deplored demonstration, stating nationalization not based on communal considerations. Christians have scheduled further demonstration for August 31. Three Killed in Demonstration Against Nationalization Christian Schools, Aug. 31, 1972

The students of the highly conservative Frontier College for Women have been discarding their burkas and in a militant mood have "gheraoed" their institution in an effort to compel the provincial authorities to stop the transfer of the College Principal, Miss Awan. ... Apart from the petty nature of the struggle in which the Governor has gotten himself involved unnecessarily, the "strike" should be considered a sociological breakthrough for the Frontier. It isn't very often that sheltered young ladies of the NWFP act in utter defiance of Victorian backgrounds. Notes from Peshawar, March 27, 1972

Hard to believe this new anti-Mujib campaign could have been launched without at least acquiescence of some entity within GOP. If, as many believe, GOP accomodation with Mujib is only way out of present crisis, GOP propagandists would seem to be painting selves even more tightly into corner by inflaming West Pak populace against Mujib. New Twist in "Crush India" Propaganda Campaign, Oct. 26, 1971

A "Crush India" procession marched through Lahore on the morning of November 7 with thousands of Lahorites participating, according to the right wing Jamiat-i-Islam newspaper, Kohistan. Left wing papers claimed that there were only a couple hundred demonstrators. ... On November 8 a large students procession organized by the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba (IJT) paraded through Lahore. The students carried placards such as "Crush India" and "Liquidate the Treacherous Enemy." Anti-India Demonstration and Procession, Nov. 9, 1971

Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works. For educational use only.

Friday, 14 November 2014

QK Archives: Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession: Pakhtunistan

Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession

'these excerpts are from the Paul Wolf website which is no longer available online. It is taken from the
U.S. National Archives and are reproduced here for archival purposes'

Pre-Colonial Roots
Pashtunistan Politics
National Awami Party
Radio Kabul Propaganda
Pashtun Leaders Dying in Prisons
Indian Influence
Soviet Position


Pre-Colonial Roots
Long before the British or the Sikhs appeared on the scene, the Eastern Afghans, whom we know broadly as Pathans, had developed separately from the Western Afghans. The former had their political and economic ties with the State ruling in the Indus Valley, namely the Mughals; the latter with the Safavis of Iran. So much were the Western Afghans - the Abdalis (Durranis) especially-turned towards Iran that they adopted the Persian language in place of their 'native' Pashto. This is still so today. The British were thus not only 'colonialists' in bringing the Eastern Afghans within the sub-continent; it was those people's historic and natural place. ... What about the extent of this Pakhtunistan? It is shown on Afghan maps as embracing not only the territory inhabited by Pathans between the Indus and the Durand Line but also the whole great square of Baluchistan south of Quetta, and no one of the territories named in the north, is Pathan at all. The Pathans at the Crossroads, by Olaf Caroe, Dec. 1961

Before betraying the trust and hopes of their brothers in Pakistan, the Afghan people will go hungry. It should be clear that Afghans always put pride in their nation ("mellat") before their wealth and well being since they have sacrificed so much for it before. Proof of the strength of this spirit is in the Afghan's history of paying the high price of independence in the era of imperialism by fighting three wars against the British, thereby remaining isolated and undeveloped, while the peoples of India gained important material advantages (e.g. railroads), but sacrificed their pride and national identity to the Raj. RGA Chief of Pushtunistan Affairs Discusses Pushtunistan, Nov. 6, 1962

On Pushtunistan, Professor Tucci commented that in the tribal areas the issue was not important. The people considered themselves as Yusufzai, Mamund, Afridi, etc. not Pushtoons. It was in the settled areas where the tribal affiliations have broken down that the concept of a Pushtu nationality had taken root and under the influence of Afghan propaganda could become a major political force. For this reason, said Tucci, the Government of Pakistan could not allow Afghan activity in the settled areas. The Afghan consulate at Peshawar could not be allowed to resume its functions. Memorandum of Conversation with Professor G. Tucci, Director of the Italian Archaeological Expeditions to Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Dec. 2, 1962

Pashtunistan Politics
Editorial Observations of Pushtoonistan Propaganda in India, Jan. 27, 1951

The Government of Pushtoonistan, Jan. 27, 1951

NAME, Dec. 24, 1952

NAME, April 23, 1953

The report that Vice President Nixon had made statements in Afghanistan to the effect that he hoped the Pukhtoonistan issue could be solved was reported and commented upon in unfavorable terms here. The burden of most complaints was that Nixon should not have even taken note of such a "dead issue" and that his statement in effect adds fuel to the "ashes of a problem which since the establishment of Pakistan has ceased to exist." Weekly Summary, Political Events, 3 through 9 December, 1953, Dec. 10, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation Concerning Pushtoonistan, Feb. 19, 1954

Effects of Pushtunistan Agitation in NWFP, Feb. 24, 1954

Radio Quetta of February 5, 1963, reported that Mr. Wali Khan, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the well known former leader of the Khodaye Khedmatgaran (Servants of God), made a statement denouncing the RGA's Pushtunistan campaign as "nonsense" which, if not halted, will elicit a "strong blow" from the Pushtuns of Pakistan. Son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Reportedly Condemns RGA Pushtunistan Policy, Feb. 18, 1963

Aziz frankly admitted that Afghan agents operating out of Kandahar continue to spread Pushtunistan literature throughout the region, particularly the Quetta Division. Afghan Consul in Quetta Comments on GOP Surveillance and Harrassment and on Constitutional Reform in Afghanistan, Jan. 25, 1964

Jirga then adopted resolution on Pushtunistan, substance of which follows" "At this opportunity when Afghan nation reorganizing its national life on firm bases of democracy, freedom and justice, our religious, national and historical duty of supporting rights of people of Pushtunistan, who unfortunately still deprived of their natural right of self-determination and individual and social rights, stands before us vividly. We representatives of nation in supporting and approving Govt's policy proclaim once again support of whole nation for Afghanistan's unchangeable policy in this regard and await day when Pushtunistan issue would be settled in accordance with real wishes its people and leaders and our brethren in Pushtunistan would attain their rights." Telegram from Kabul Embassy to Secretary of State, Sept 21, 1964

Coming to the present, the Prime Minister stated that his most serious current problem was trying to cope with the "unmerciful pressure" being exerted on him by the protagonists of "Pushtunistan." Delegations from the tribal areas had been calling on him to urge direct action in achieving "Pushtunistan." They had been criticizing his Government for failing to encourage the tribes to effect a forceful solution of the issue. The Prime Minister asked me what I though he should do about such pressures. I replied that, in my personal view, he would be well advised to resist such pressures. ... The Prime Minister replied that he was having an exceedingly hard time, indeed, "holding off these firebrands." In response to my question, he asserted that the pressures being exerted by those desiring forceful action on "Pushtunistan" now were far greater than the countervailing counsels of those advocating cooperation with Pakistan in her hour of crisis. Conversation with Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf Regarding Current Regional Affairs, September 22, 1965

[Abdul Ghaffar Khan] restated his interest in "self determination" for the Pathans, but also said that he did not wish to embarrass Pakistan, particularly at this time when Pakistan was at war with India. Askar Ali interpreted this to mean that AGK was no longer pushing for an independent or autonomous Pushtoonistan, but admitted that he could only draw this inference from the moderate tone of AGK's statements. Pushtoonistan, Oct. 8, 1965

Etemadi pointed out that quiet RGA assurances to GOP that it would not put any pressure on Pak western border during hostilities had enabled Pak army concentrate its full strength against the Indians. In return RGA had expected as minimum a benign GOP policy in Pushtun areas. ... Afganistan did not have any territorial claims against Pakistan: Afghanistan demanded only full respect for the apartness and special character of the frontier regions and non-interference with the traditional way of life of the Pushtuns. Pak-Afghan Relations, Nov. 11, 1965

A usually reliable source with extensive contacts on the Frontier tells us that "Pushtunistan" activity has been revived in South Waziristan near the Afghan border. The son of the Faqir of Ipi and his followers have been provided with a modern offset printing press, which is installed in their mountain cave hideouts and is producing some well-printed pamplets pushing Pushtunistan. Also bribes are again being passed out for the flying of Pushtunistan flags along the Waziristan border. Our source coupled this report with news of Soviet arms deliveries to India and speculates that it is Russian rather than Indian money which is supporting the current revival. His rationalization is that the Soviets are concerned over recent deliveries of Chinese arms to Pakistan and possible further ChiCom inroads here, so hey are reinforcing their influence and activities in the flanks. Reported Revival of Pushtunistan Activity, June 6, 1966

There are no longer garrisons in the tribal areas, and punitive expeditions are an extreme rarity these days. Even when government officials have been kidnapped recently, the Government had reportedly anted up the ransom quietly rather than stir up trouble by punishing the tribe collectively as done by the British. When in doubt, officials placate the tribesmen, or resort to persuasion, bribery, and "divide and rule" tactics rather than force. ... The Consulate finds no evidence that "Pushtoonistan" is a viable movement in Pakistan, nor any current threat to the integrity of the nation. The Pathans have never been able to work together, and there is nothing but a vague emotional attachment to the Pushto language and culture to unite tribes which have been feuding with one another for centuries. Report From Occupied Pushtunistan, June 16, 1966

Right-wing nationalist Afghan Mellat held pro-Pushtunistan demonstration December 2, attracting crowd of about 500. Riot police much in evidence but no violence occurred. ... The general theme of demonstration was that RGA has let Pushtunistan slip through its fingers three times, the current Subcontinent situation being the third. Afghan Mellat demonstration on Pushtunistan, Dec. 4, 1971

We are concerned that domestic political pressures in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be pushing both countries contrary to their own interests and desires -- toward a confrontation over terrain and loyalties of Pushtun people. Pak-Afghan Relations, March 28, 1972

Afghan Amb voiced serious concern over impact on Afghanistan of current poor relations between GOP and Pathans of Pakistan as led by Wali Khan and NAP. He fears that continued pressure on Pathan leadership in NWFP could lead to war between Afghanistan and Pakistan in which USSR might very well be drawn in. Afghanistan Concern Over Events in Pakistan, March 28, 1973

Pashtunistan Revived. With the coup-makers themselves having demonstrated the ease with which a few junior officers can take control, Kabul abounds with coup rumors. An already tense situation has been exacerbated by the mass arrests. The "Pushtunistan" dispute with Pakistan may be the only major political issue on which the Afghans are in general agreement. If they are not able to take any concrete action on it, at least it can be exploited to divert attention from domestic grievances. Afghanistan: Cracks in the Facade, Sept. 26, 1973

The Government of Pakistan cannot but express its deep regret over the fact that Afghanistan should continue to persist in its demands on "Pakhtoonistan". This demand is aimed against the territorial integrity of Pakistan and questions a frontier which was delimited and demarcated through an international treaty and which has been in existence and respected as such for over three quarters of a century. Aide Memoire, Sept. 28, 1973

National Awami Party
The news that the NAP has been formally reactivated was preceded by reports in the press of many meetings of the NAP in villages in the Peshawar-Charsadda-Mardan area, long the heartland of the Red Shirt-NAP organizations. At one such meeting in Shaidan, a small village in the Red Shirt area south of Peshawar, resolutions were passed opposing One Unit, demanding the release of political detenus, and supporting the formation of a "national front" organization. The press reported that ABDUL WALI Khan, son of AGK, had been given the responsibility and power to contact and negotiate with other groups throughout Pakistan for the formation of the national front. ... In Askar's opinion, Ghaffar Khan and the other "graybeards" of the old Red Shirt movement are actually far more cautious and conservative in their approach than the younger element. These younger men are now conducting NAP affairs in accordance with instructions from those who are in prison, but their personal inclination is to enter into an alignment with the Afghans. Frontier National Awami Party: Report on Renewed Activities and on Present and Future Leadership, Sept. 3, 1962

ABDUL HANAN, a veteran Consulate driver who is a Kuz Mohmand from a small village southwest of Peshawar, recently reported for work with a discernible pain in his side. On being queried as to the trouble and cause, Hanan replied with much embarrassment that he had been struck by his village mullah because he, Hanan, had refused to join the National Awami Party (NAP). Hanan said that, in common with many villages, the mullah in his village is the leading organizer of the NAP, or, as the organization is still called in the villages, the "Surkh Posh" -- "Red Shirts" in Pukhtu. Coercive National Awami Party Recruitment Methods as Experienced by a Consulate Employee, April 24, 1963

Much as he would like to speed the demise of the NAP, Bhutto is inhibited by political realities. Any central-government intervention in the NAP-dominated administration of Baluchistan, or for that matter any action against the NAP, would at least complicate Bhutto's constitutional negotiations with the NAP, and might jeopardize the fragile unity of residual Pakistan. Pakistan: What's Up in Baluchistan? Feb 8, 1973

Several hours after dismissing National Awami Party governors in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, Bhutto announced appointment of Akbar Bugti. Tribal Chief Bugti Baluch tribe and bitter foe of present NAP government in Baluchistan, as Governor of that province and appointment of Aslam Khattak, current speaker provincial assemply and leader of Independent United Front (which has been supporting NAP coalition provincial government), as Governor of Frontier. Bhutto Names New Governors and Dismisses Baluchistan Government, Feb. 15, 1973

Army Chief of Staff, General Tikka Khan, told me February 20 that both Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces are quiet militarily. Describing background of recent disturbances in Lasbela District of Baluchistan, he said problem had arisen from combination of local tribal and political factors. NAP govt under Baluchistan Governor Bizenjo had taken number of steps to bring armed forces to bear. These had included activation of tribal Lashkars who had been armed by provincial govt, deployment of rural guard and arming of tribal "levies". Eventually Bizenjo agreed to dispatch of federal forces. Internal Developments: Pakistan Army Activities in Baluchistan and Frontier Provinces, Feb. 22, 1973

GOP-controlled press April 8 carried story linking opposition National Awami Party (NAP) with Baghdad-based Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF). Most allegations in story were ancient history culled from old BLF publications, and emphasized alleged Soviet support for Baluch irredentist claims. Presumably because of current GOP efforts to repair relations with USSR, Foreign Ministry felt constrained next day to issue vague denial of Soviet involvement. "Free" Baluchistan: Cartographic Aggression, April 11, 1973

Law and order situation in Baluchistan has worsened as provincial assembly session nears. Eight members of security forces reportedly killed by Marri tribesmen and Mengal tribesmen allegedly attacked Kalat official and party. Bugti government, citing above incidents, has stepped up its vigorous attacks on NAP aims, leaders, associates. NAP counterattack appears to be growing a bit hysterical. ... Bizenjo said Baluchistan government had suspended food supplies to sections of province and was using federal forces in attempt achieve political aims that minority government could not accomplish otherwise. Baluchistan Continues to Bubble, May 22, 1973

According local press accounts, several leading Marri tribesmen, including younger brother of Baluchisan NAP President Khair Bukshmphan Marrin "surrendered" to GOB authorities June 2 and declared themselves loyal citizens of Pakistan. Tribal elders told Governor Bugti, with whom they appeared in hastily called press conference at Government House, Quetta, that they represented 40,000 of the 60,000 Marri tribesmen. Marri Tribesmen Reportedly Declare Loyalty to Pakistan, June 4, 1973

The long dormant "Pahstunistan" issue, revived following the July 17 coup in Afghanistan, has been exacerbated by the arrest last week of the leaders of the National Awami Party (NAP) in Pakistan's turbulent province of Baluchistan. ... The new government of Afghanistan has also taken a very serious view of events in Baluchistan, and is supporting the NAP leaders. President Daud has long contended that Pakistan should allow the people of the two border provinces, which the Afghans label Pashtunistan, the freedom to establish either an autonomous or independent state. Pakistan: Internal Dissidence and Regional Conflict, Aug. 23, 1973

Radio Kabul Propaganda
Characteristic Samplings from Radio Kabul's Broadcasts Beamed to Pakistan, Sept. 28, 1950

The contact with the Pushtun leaders is particularly interesting because of its possible significance for the Pushtunistan issue. Both the source and Mr. Majruh speculated that the Prime Minister might be trying to "soften the blow" of what many people in Kabul consider the inevitable decision to further downgrade the Pushtunistan campaign. Prime Minister Yusuf Active in Personal Contact with Former Opposition and Tribal Leaders, April 14, 1963

The source said that he believed that it was probable that the Pushtun racist ideas had found a ready audience among the many Pushtuns in Kabul. He said these people were quite aware that Pushtunistan propaganda output has been decreased and that, even more significant, that the RGA had done almost nothing concrete and direct to further the cause of Pushtun nationalism since the Bajaur debacle in the fall of 1960. In this context, according to the source, the appointment of a Tajik Prime Minister (Yusuf) accompanied by a noticeable softening of the Pushtunistan campaign was felt ot foreshadow a government policy of shifting the emphasis from exalting the uniqueness and primacy of Pushtun language and culture to one of subordinating it to a policy of national unity, which in Afghanistan necessarily means the fostering of a multi-ethnic, and thus predominantly Persianized culture. Anti-Daud Pushtun Notes Increase in Expression of Pushtun Racist Ideas, June 16, 1963

The following is Radio Pakistan's summary of their monitoring of Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan propaganda September 22 to September 29: "Radio Kabul reverted to broadcasting reports of clashes between Milli Mujahideen and Pakistan forces in Bajaur, and commenting upon them. No less than four incidents were reported during the week and each was made the subject of highly inflammatory talk on the Pukhtunistan Special Program. All spoke of the tremendous awakening sweeping 'from one end of Pukhtunistan to the other' and requiring only a spark to set the whole place ablaze." Radio Kabul Pukhtunistan Propaganda, Oct. 5, 1963

Radio Kabul on Dec. 28 launched a propaganda campaign against Pakistan, asserting and implying that the National Assembly had enacted legislation "imposing" the courts and laws of Pakistan on the Tribal Areas of West Pakistan, identified by the RGA as "Azad Pukhtunistan." The broadcasts correctly stated that certain members of the National Assembly had suggested during the debate on the Fundamental Rights Bill that the Tribal Areas should be brought within the scope of the Bill. The broadcasts did not state that the suggestions were quickly brushed aside in the Assembly, but as noted they regularly implied and at times stated that such legislation had in fact been passed. Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan Campaign, Jan. 30, 1964

Radio Kabul stepped up propaganda about "the worsening of the situation" in the whole of Pukhtunistan and reported new clashes between "the Milli Mujahideen" and Pak forces in Jhalwan and Kalat in which Pak jets were used. Reports of tribal jirgas and arrests of "nationalists" were also stepped up. There were reports of "pressure" on various persons, arrests of an Imam of a mosque and some people for distributing posters, and police surveillance of political prisoners brought to Peshawar hospital. Radio Pakistan's Weekly Analysis of Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan Propaganda, March 8-15, 1964

In addition to the normal reporting on jirgas in tribal areas and gatherings in Peshawar being held by "Pashtunistan nationalists" to press their demand for self-determination and to protest the arrest and detention of nationalists, the Afghan press and radio continue to report the occurrence of clashes in "Pashtunistan" between "nationalists" and the Pakistani police and military. ... According to these allegations, 6 clashes occurred in Baluchistan (February through April), 7 in Bajaur (April and May), and 1 near Jandola in "Central Pashtunistan" (May). These reports claimed that Pakistani convoys have been ambushed and that police and troops were wounded and killed; "heavy losses" were sustained by the Pakistanis although they used Air Force planes for reconnaisance and, as Abdul Haq, an opposition member of the Pakistani National Assembly reportedly stated in the Assembly on March 31, even bombed a village in Kalat on February 15. RGA Continues to Report Clashes in "Pashtunistan," June 6, 1964

FYI We have in mind further toning down Pushtunistan propaganda which seems to have increased in recent months. END FYI Telegram from Department of State, June 26, 1964

Afghan propaganda on "Pushtunistan", as suggested in Karachi's telegram cited above, has been stepped up since October of this year, the new element being a tendency toward incitement. Thus on November 26 the Pushtunistan program of Radio Kabul called for "action" by the Pushtunistanis to fulfill their aspirations. On December 3 the program commented that after taking up the sword the people should continue fighting until they achieved their freedom. This incitement follows the broadcast of November 12 which pointed out that the "war of nerves" is as significant in the conduct of combat as the fighting itself, and that this is the way ahead for the "Pushtunistani nation." This new trend appears in the midst of continued reports of clashes between "nationalists" and Pakistani police and troops. Afghan Propaganda on "Pushtunistan," Dec. 12, 1964

Propaganda has described the recent disturbances at the University of Peshawar and elsewhere (Kohat, Mardan) as stemming from the "nationalist struggle," and has noted that the grievances and sufferings of the students (arrests, rustications, use of tear gas to break up demonstrations) had mass support among the "Pushtunistanis". ... The Afghan press and radio continued to report that a large number of jirgas were held in "Pushtunistan" to condemn Pakistani "intervention", to pass resolutions imposing sanctions on any tribal member who cooperated with Pakistani authorities, and to demand the release of political prisoners. The Bajaur region was most frequently reported to be the scene of such jirgas, with the Tirrah and Central Pushtunistan (the Masud tribe) also frequently cited. Reports of clashes were more frequent, particularly in Baluchistan. ... Afghan propaganda continued to contain an element of incitement and to claim that a general revolt was underway. Afghan Propaganda on "Pushtunistan," March 2, 1965

According to [Radio Pakistan's] monitoring reports, the broadcasts continued to stress alleged battles between tribal nationalists and Pakistan security forces, reported on tribal demands for Pukhtunistan, and, primarily through poems or songs, incited the tribes to revolt. Radio Kabul's Pukhtunstan Propaganda, March 10, 1965

Kabul Radio reported in Pushtu May 27 that "nationalists" from "Central Pushtunistan" attacked Pakistani military establishments at Jandola, Siroki and Razmak. In another report June 17 from Central Pushtunistan, Kabul Radio reported that Baholzai "nationalists" under the command of Mohammed Zaman Khan and Lambai Khan attacked Pakistani military establishments at Manizayee. On the same date an attack on the Pakistani military camp at Gomal by Mahsuds under the leadership of Niamatullah Khan and Ghulam Habib Khan was reported. Developments in Afghan-Pakistani Relations, July 3, 1965

On june 26 Kaubl Radio reported a series of alleged events in Waziristan beginning with the blocking of the Miran Shah road, followed by an attack on the Pakistan Army post at Watakhel, by "Mujahiddin" tribesmen. These events reportedly served as the prelude to a massive jirga near Watakhel, affter which attacks were renewed on the military post. A group of Wazirs and Masuds also reportedly ambushed a Pakistan military truck, injured a Pakistani officer travelling therein and took over some military equipment. Another report on June 27 said that the Wazirs, in cutting the road between Datta Khel and Miran Shaha, had been able to capture 10 Pakistani military vehicles. On June 30, Kabul Radio reported that Wazirs had attacked the Pakistani military post near Boya and demolished it. Reportedly four Pakistani soldiers were killed in this action. On July 3 the Pakistanis perhaps in retaliation attacked a jirga held by members of the Dawar tribe near Miran Shah; three "nationalists" were killed and nine wounded. The Dawars immediately then began an attack on the Pakistani military installation at Miran Shah. Pakistan-Afghan Relations, June 25 - July 14, 1965

The theme of the programs during this period was that of describing "Pakistani repression" of the Pukhtoons as a virtual continuation of British suppression. At times, the broadcasts advocated revolt by alleging that "all Pukhtunistan" was up in arms and proclaiming that the time had come for all true Pukhtoons to take up arms. Actual incidents such as the Salarzai clashes in the north and the Mari-Bugti trouble in Baluchistan were embellished and reported and some pro-Government Jirgas were reported as though they had made anti-government decisions. Radio Pakistan's reporting on Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan Propaganda, July 14, 1965

These revealing observations by responsible senior Afghan officials confirm recent CAS [CIA] reports and Embassy assessments of other indications (diminution of "Pushtunistan" propaganda, official public statements partial toward Pakistan, significant private comment) suggesting that Afghanistan has been deliberately pursuing a conciliatory policy toward Pakistan, possibly in the hope of obtaining concessions later on the "Pushtunistan" issue. More specifically, they confirm CAS reports to the effect that the RGA has initiated negotiations with the GOP aimed at resolving the "Pushtunistan" dispute. Senior MFA Official Reveals RGA Seeking Negotiated Settlement of "Pushtunistan" with GOP; Minister Confirms, Oct. 9, 1965

The issue of "Pakhtoonistan" does not seem to excite the tribesmen very much. On the strength of some soundings among the tribal maliks one gets the impression that an "independent Pakhtoonistan" would not serve the interests of the tribes. A current view is that "Pakhtoonistan" may end up as an appendage of Afghanistan to the detriment of tribal independence. Neither are the advocates of Pakhtoonistan, the NAP leaders, held in high regard. The simple tribal mind is suspicious of both Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son Wali who, some people think have aspirations of becoming "kings of Pakhtoonistan." And suspicion is strengthened by the fact that NAP has advocated the merger of tribal territory with the settled districts. Politics and Elections in Tribal Territory, Nov. 13, 1970

GOI sources acknowledge that during last year's Indo-Pak crisis, All India Radio (AIR) introduced Sindhi program, and expanded programs in Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, Pushtu, and Baluchi, though AIR had and continues to have problem retaining services of reliable Baluchi speaker. MEA sources aver that until outbreak of war, these programs (except for Bengali) were largely cultural and informational, and did not even indirectly question allegiance to Islamabad of West Pakistan's constituent units. Though sources not specific, they suggest that during hear of war, program content obviously changed, with harsh attacks on Yahya regime. They claim that presently, however, programs have reverted to pre-war tone, and that India's sole reasons for making broadcasts are to show "all peoples of countries in region that India is friendly," and to ensure that people of Pakistan not forced to rely on Radio Pakistan alone for news of India and of world. Indian Intentions Re Baluchistan and Pashtunistan, Jan. 17. 1972

As reported in Kabul's 1545, the RGA announced March 14 that on the instructions of Prime Minister Zahir the publicity organs of the government were henceforth to expand their coverage of Pashtunistan subjects. The Prime Minister's order established guidelines for the Ministry of Information and Culture to set up committees to supervise editorial policy, radio publicity, and administrative and financial aspects of the campaign. Afghanistan Steps Up Rhetoric on Pashtunistan, March 20, 1972

[T]he RGA announced on March 14 that henceforth the government's publicity organs would expand coverage given to Pashtunistan subjects. The three committees established to supervise the campaign (a central supervising committee, radio subcommittee and administrative committee) have so far functioned sporadically or only in name; and the central policymaking committee has held no meetings at all in recent weeks. Pashtunistan: Publicity Campaign Still Under Wraps, May 13, 1972

Since onset of latest domestic crisis between Bhutto government and opposition parties, according to Shaukat, Radio Kabul especially has been beaming inflammatory propaganda (presumably in Pushtu) at Pathan population of North West Frontier Province. All India Radio has also been broadcasting propaganda material drawing comparison between current situation in Pakistan and 1971 East Pakistan civil war, Shaukat said. Afghan and Indian Propaganda Broadcasts, March 30, 1973

Pashtun Leaders Dying in Prisons
Sarfaraz said when he took over as Political Agent of the Mohmand Agency in October, 1959, Hassan Khan and over 400 members of his family, including women and children, had already been in jail for many months. The Political Agent said that at the first big Mohmand jirga over which he presided, scores of Afghan Mohmands who had known him in Jalalabad attended the jirga to seek his help in obtaining Hassan Khan's release. Mohmand Malik's Death in Kabul Jail Stirs Local Interest, Dec. 5, 1962

Hassan Khan, a Mohmand Malik and former President of the Northern Pushtunistan Assembly, did die of mistreatment in a Kabul jail about six weeks ago. Death of Mohmand Malik in a Kabul Jail, Jan. 7, 1963

Kabul press and radio reported on January 15 that Namdar Khan, an important leader of the outlawed Khodaye Khedmatgar political party, died of mistreatment in a Peshawar jail. ... Before its suppression the Khodaye Khedmatgar (Servants of God) was reportedly a very influential pro-Pushtunistan force in Pakistan's NWFP area. Its President was Abdul Gaffar Khan, virtually the patron saint of Pushtunistan to many Pushtuns, who has spent a number of years in Pakistani prisons. Alleged Death of Pushtun Leader in a Peshawar Jail, Jan. 28, 1963

Indian Influence
On October 10, 1962 two Indian Embassy officers gave the reporting officer their views on the Afghan political situation. They both showed deep concern over the tightening Soviet grip on Afghanistan and considered that unless the present drift is soon halted, Afghanistan will be drawn into the Soviet orbit. They regarded the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the latter country's "Pushtunistan" policies as the major factor in increasing Soviet influence here and considered resolution of this dispute unlikely becuase of the rigid positions of both countries. Indian Embassy Officers on Afghan Political Situation, Oct. 28, 1962

An All-India Radio (AIR) program August 10 mentioned Afghanistan specifically as "a victim" of Pakistan's religious "defamation". The commentator observed, "Afghans support their Pushtun brothers who are oppressed by their Pakistani rulers." AIR on August 16 referred to a Kabul Radio broadcast in reporting alleged Pakistan suppression of the "Pushtunistan freedom movement." ... as tensions increased between India and Pakistan All-India Radio utilized more and more Kabul Radio "Pushtunistan" broadcasts, some over a month old. Afghan-Pakistan Relations, August 4 - September 6, 1965

According to press reports the United Pakhtoonistan Front (UPF) was formed in New Delhi in June 1967 under the Chairmanship of Mehr Chand Khanna, former Minister of Finance in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and sometime Minister of Works, Housing and Rehabilitation in the Government of India. The political purpose of the front was made clear in a resolution passed on July 16, 1967, which endorsed the demand for Pakhtoonistan as a homeland for the Pathans. India, it said, owed a debt of gratitude to the people of the Frontier who had been among the leaders in the battle for freedom, which for the Pathans had only resulted in their being "thrown to the wolves" in Pakistan. ... Morarji Desai reportedly assured the delegation he would do whatever he could in this cause. Formation of the United Pakhtoonistan Front, August 17, 1967

In a recent session with the reporting officer, the Acting Director of MEA's East Asia division C. V. RANGANATHAN stated that lively triangular correspondence had been going on between MEA and the Indian missions in Kabul and Islamabad regarding possible Chicom involvement in and support of the Pakhtoonistan independence movement. Reading from several top secret files, Ranganathan said that it had been established that Ayub Khan Achakzai, a radical Pathan advocate of an independent Pakhtoonistan was maintaining close frequent contact with the Chicom embassy in Kabul, where he is based. Peking and the Pakhtoonistan Issue, Dec. 30, 1969

Soviet Position
Mr. Anatoly I. Andreev, one of the three Counselors in the Soviet Embassy, told the reporting officer on February 6, 1963, that the Soviet Union's policy toward RGA's Pushtunistan campaign remains one of firm support coupled with the desire for a peaceful solution. In response to a question about the Soviet Union's view of the unfolding of a more active Pushtunistan policy by the Afghan Government, along the lines of the paramilitary intervention by Afghan tribes and Afghan troops in tribal dress in a dispute in Pakistan's NWFP in the fall of 1960, Andreev said that this move was clearly "aggression", and that whatever the rights of the case, the Soviet Union is firmly opposed to such developments. The Soviet diplomat added that the Pushtuns in Pakistan have an irrefutable right to self-determination, but that the dreadful spectre of nuclear war dictated that "the two nations which determine world policy," i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, could not tolerate aggression for any purpose. Soviet Diplomat Comments of USSR's Policy Toward RGA's Pushtunistan Campaign, Feb. 18, 1963

[O]ne day prior to his departure for Moscow, Afghan Prime Minister Abdul Zahir signs an order giving instructions to beef up and provide more money for Department of Pushtunistan Affairs. He ordered department to launch a propaganda campaign calling for establishment of Pushtunistan. Although Paks certain that Soviets very active in border areas in Afghanistan, and convinced that Soviets put pressure on Zahir to sign above order, they do not have hard proof that Soviets are providing arms to tribes or even funds. Afghan Intentions to heat up Pushtunistan Issue, March 15, 1972

[W]e believe PM mentioned subject in Moscow for domestic purposes ... We would not interpret statements quoted as indication either side pushing other on this or broader question. We tend believe PM would push issue, if he were going to, in private rather than public forum. Pushtunistan: Afghan Decision to Publicize Issue, March 17, 1972

Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works.